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Attacking the Nintendo 3DS Boot ROMs
Michael Scire, Melissa Mears, Devon Maloney, Matthew Norman, Shaun Tux, and Phoebe Monroe
Abstract—We demonstrate attacks on the boot ROMs of the
Nintendo 3DS in order to exfiltrate secret information from
normally protected areas of memory and gain persistent early
code execution on devices which have not previously been
compromised. The attack utilizes flaws in the RSA signature
verification implementation of one of the boot ROMs in order to
overflow ASN.1 length fields and cause invalid firmware images
to appear valid to the signature parser. This is then used to
load a custom firmware image which overwrites the data-abort
vector with a custom data abort handler, then induces a data-
abort exception in order to reliably redirect boot ROM code flow
at boot time. This executes a payload which, due to its reliable
early execution by a privileged processor, is able to function as
a persistent exploit of the system in order to exfiltrate secret
information (such as encryption keys) from normally protected
areas of memory.
Index Terms—RSA, boot ROM, cryptography, privilege esca-
lation, software security.
I. INTRODUCTION
As with all entertainment consoles, the Nintendo 3DS has
the difficult task of accommodating legitimate users while
still enforcing a reasonable level of device security. In pursuit
of accomplishing this, all models of the Nintendo 3DS are
equipped with two separate processors located in a single
System-on-Chip (“SoC”). There is a group ARM11 application
processor (“ARM11”) which runs the OS and is responsible
for userspace-level tasks, and a group ARM9 security proces-
sor (“ARM9”) which is responsible for enforcing permission
rights and managing access to cryptographic hardware and the
filesystem. This system of multiple processors with varying
levels of access, designed with the principle of least privilege
in mind, allows for a chain of trust which ensures only
authorized code is executed [1].
The root of trust for 3DS security, as with most embedded
systems, is found within the boot ROMs burned into the
processors at the factory. Specifically, the ARM9 boot ROM
(“Boot9”) contains RSA public keys to which only Nintendo
has the matching private keys. This is used to implement
a secure bootchain designed to ensure that only firmware
images signed by Nintendo will run on the system. This
bootchain, rooted at the public keys in Boot9, is responsible
for initializing device hardware and securely launching system
firmware from storage [2].
To help facilitate the security of this bootchain, both Boot9
and its ARM11 counterpart (“Boot11”) are split into two
halves. The first half is readable from firmware given sufficient
privileges, while the second half is made unreadable early in
the boot process by setting specific registers which can only
be written to once per boot. By combining this concept of
“unprotected” and “protected” halves with implementations of
AES and RSA write-only “keyslots” (secure memory areas
readable only by the respective hardware AES and RSA
implementations), Nintendo is able to store and use secret keys
in such a way that even a fully compromised system will not
expose all secure data [3] [4].
II. SECURE BOOTCHAIN
A. Known Information
In the “Nintendo Hacking 2016” talk given at the 33rd
Chaos Communication Congress (“33C3”), one of the speakers
(“derrek”) detailed the use of a known hardware “Vector-
Glitch” attack to dump the protected half of Boot9. This
approach was reported to be highly unstable and, due to Boot9
being unshareable copyrighted code, would have to be re-
implemented by any successive attacker (requiring access to
prohibitively expensive hardware). Although this means that
the speaker’s Vector-Glitch attack is impractical to reproduce
consistently, the talk is still useful due to the information it
provides about the protected half of Boot9 [5].
B. Firmware Images
The firmware image loaded by Boot9 is stored encrypted
on the boot device. The plaintext of this encrypted image
consists of a firmware image header and up to four firmware
‘sections’. The firmware image header contains a magic value
(FIRM), a boot priority, the ARM9 and ARM11 entrypoints,
the firmware section headers, and an RSA-2048 signature
over a SHA-256 hash of the rest of the firmware header.
The firmware section headers each contain the offset of the
firmware section, the physical address to load the section to,
the size of the firmware section, the copy method to use in
loading the firmware section, and a SHA-256 hash of the
firmware section. In a stock firmware image, the firmware
sections contain the ARM9 kernel, the ARM11 kernel, and
other data required to initialize the system [6].
C. Boot Process
All 3DS models have identical boot ROMs burned in at
the factory, and thus have the same initial boot process
implementation which is performed by Boot9 [2] [5]:
1) Initialize AES keyslots with secret keys from Boot9
(using AES hardware to decrypt all subsequent data read
from boot device)
2) Initialize RSA keyslots with firmware public keys from
Boot9 (using separate keys for various signature and
console types)
3) Select boot device (typically NAND flash storage)
4) Read firmware header from selected boot device to
memory
5) Validate SHA-256 hash and RSA-2048 signature of
firmware header
6) Read firmware sections to memory according to param-
eters specified by firmware section headers
27) Disable access to protected halves of Boot9 and Boot11
8) Jump to ARM9 and ARM11 entrypoints specified by
firmware header
This is a simple, robust boot process which seems secure
from a conceptual perspective. Any flaws in this bootchain
must, therefore, lie in the implementation rather than the
theory.
III. SIGNATURE VERIFICATION
A. Known Information
In the previously mentioned “Nintendo Hacking 2016” talk,
the existence of several flaws in the implementation of this
seemingly secure boot process were revealed [5]. Unfortu-
nately, performing an attack based on these flaws requires
details which can only be found by examining the protected
half of Boot9. The speakers of the talk kept these details a
secret, which required us to pursue a more creative approach
to exploit these flaws.
B. Firmware Header Signatures
Recall that RSA signatures are, essentially (as an over-
simplification), a specifically formatted hash which has been
encrypted by a signer’s private key. These signatures are then
verified by calculating the hash of the data, decrypting the
the signature using the signer’s matching public key, then
verifying the hash which was calculated matches the hash
embedded in the signature. The exact formatting and ‘padding’
used for the hash in an RSA signature are extremely important
for preventing numerous attacks on it.
In the case of the 3DS, the private key is possessed only by
Nintendo, the public key is embedded in Boot9, and the data
being verified is the firmware header loaded by Boot9. Specif-
ically, the firmware header is signed by a PKCS#1v1.5 padded
RSA-2048 signature with an embedded ASN.1 encoded SHA-
256 hash. An RSA-2048 signature is 0x100 bytes in length,
while a SHA-256 hash is only 0x20 bytes in length. This
means that the remaining bytes are filled by a deterministic
padding of FF bytes followed by a fixed ASN.1 DER encoding
of the hash type.
To parse this relatively complex structure, Nintendo decided
to write their own signature parser. This signature parser is
flawed in the following ways [5]:
1) Bounds checking is not performed when parsing one or
more ASN.1 length fields, allowing for length values to
point beyond the signature block
2) PKCS#1v1.5 Block Type 2 (designed for encrypted mes-
sages, not signatures) is permitted, allowing for arbitrary
padding rather than just FF bytes
3) Padding is not required to completely fill the signature
block, allowing for a less strict signature layout
The first flaw is critical because the parser adds the ASN.1
length fields to the current memory offset to arrive at the
location of the SHA-256 hash embedded in the signature (“em-
bedded hash”) used for comparison. This means a signature
can be calculated where the length fields overflow valid lengths
and cause the parser to look elsewhere on the stack for the
embedded hash.
This allows for an attack in which very specific length fields
cause the signature parser to use the exact area of memory
on the stack where it already stored the calculated SHA-256
hash of the firmware header (“calculated hash”), rather than
the area of memory on the stack where the embedded hash is.
This results in the signature parser comparing the calculated
hash with itself instead of the embedded hash, which never
fails. This means any firmware image using this signature will
appear to be validly signed to the signature parser, enabling
the “fakesigning” of arbitrary firmware images.
The second and third flaws severely weaken the security
of the signature itself because they allow for attacks on RSA
which would normally be stopped by strict padding checks.
This means that a search for a valid signature to exploit the
first flaw can take place in a significantly shorter amount of
time than would otherwise be possible.
IV. BLIND EXPLOITATION
A. Missing information
As mentioned previously, knowledge of these flaws alone is
not sufficient to perform an attack. This is because the critical
flaw allows for the the use of crafted length fields to modify
where the parser looks for the embedded hash on the stack,
which is only useful if the parser can be made to look at
the calculated hash. This requires knowledge of both which
length fields are improperly verified and where in the stack
the calculated signature is located. The first approach to try
is to search for possible re-use of the flawed signature parser
elsewhere.
Examining the signature parser used by the firmware itself
to verify the integrity of software reveals it to be very similar
to the described Boot9 signature parser, though with the
addition of strict padding checks which prevent an attack.
These padding checks are present in all firmware versions
from 1.0.0 (kernel 0.14) onward, meaning that these flaws
were noticed and fixed some time after Boot9 was finalized
but before firmware 1.0.0 was shipped.
B. Factory Firmware
NAND flash storage, as with most non-volatile storage
mediums, does not actually erase information completely when
instructed to (in most cases); rather, information is simply
marked as erased and can be overwritten by new information
at a later time. By examining a decrypted 3DS NAND flash
image, it is possible to recover fragments of data left over
from the firmware installed to the device at the factory (which
was erased from the device before it was sold).
When enough devices are examined (especially those which
have only been lighly used), it is possible to re-assemble
these fragments into a pre-1.0.0 ’factory firmware’ (kernel
0.13). When this factory firmware is examined, we see a
similar signature parser to firmware 1.0.0, but without the strict
padding checks. This means that factory firmware is vulnerable
to the same signature verification flaws as Boot9, and thus
its signature parser can be inferred to be very similar to the
signature parser used in Boot9.
3C. Signature Calculations
Note that different public keys are used for the various
signature and console types (a total of 6). These are split into
the ‘Retail’ and ‘Developer’ categories, where the former is
used in standard consoles and the latter is used in official
Nintendo Developer Program Consoles.
The three signature types within these two categories are the
following: the ‘NCSD header’ signature (verifies the partition
layout and encryption methods), the ‘NAND boot’ signature
(verifies firmware images loaded from NAND flash storage),
and the ‘non-NAND boot’ signature (verifies firmware images
loaded from sources other than NAND flash storage). For this
initial test, a retail device booting from NAND flash storage
was chosen.
By examining the signature parser used in factory firmware,
we can both determine which ASN.1 length fields are in-
correctly verified and the location on the stack where the
calculated hash will be. With this information, we then calcu-
lated a signature which correctly overflows the ASN.1 length
fields to exploit the factor firmware signature parser (“exploit
signature”) and tested it on Boot9. Unfortunately, this led us to
the discovery that, while the signature parser used by factory
firmware is very similar to the signature parser used in Boot9,
they are not identical.
Interestingly, this caused Boot9 to display a black screen
rather than the standard blue error screen normally shown
when Boot9 encounters an error (such as a failed signature
check). This means that, while the signature was successful
in causing the parser to look elsewhere on the stack for the
embedded hash, the memory the parser was trying to access
was invalid which was resulting in an unhandled data-abort
exception. From this, we know that the calculated hash is in a
different location on the stack than it is for factory firmware.
D. Brute-forcing Signatures
We can calculate that, for this signature parser, there are
only 128 possible locations on the stack (relative to the
signature) for which a signature can be brute-forced in a rea-
sonable amount of time to exploit the length field vulnerability.
Because this exploit has been performed before, we know that
the calculated hash for Boot9’s signature parser must be in one
of these 128 locations. We can then search through randomly
generated signatures (a “brute-force”) to find valid signatures
that cause the signature parser to look for the embedded hash
at these 128 locations.
Recall that RSA signatures are created by powering plain-
text message m by secret d using modulus n, and verified by
powering signature s by RSA exponent e (65537 in this case)
using modulus n:
s ≡ md (mod n) and v ≡ se (mod n)
The simple method for calculating signature s for an exploit
plaintext m would be to calculate m ≡ s65537 (mod n) for a
random s until a usable m is found. However, this method is
extremely slow because it requires 17 multiplication operations
and 17 modulo operations per attempt.
One way to improve the speed of this signature search
is to check −m when checking m. This is because, if −m
is a match, then −s is its signature. Because subtraction
is significantly faster than multiplication, this method nearly
doubles the speed of our search.
Another way to improve the speed of our search is to take
advantage of the second and third flaw in the padding checks
of Boot9’s signature parser. Because we do not have to adhere
to strict padding checks, an ‘RSA Multiplicative Attack’ is
possible: if sa and sb are signatures for messages a and b, then
sasb (mod n) is a signature for message ab (mod n). This
results in another significant performance gain. This results in
the following brute-force search method:
1) Select random root r such that 1 < r < n
2) Calculate multiplier k such that k = r65537 (mod n)
3) Set y = 1 and z = 0
4) Define parameters for validity (based on 128 possible
locations)
5) Loop:
a) Increment z by 1
b) Perform y = (y ∗ k) (mod n)
c) Check whether y is valid
• Return rz (mod n)
d) Check whether n− y is valid
• Return −rz (mod n)
While it is difficult to express the exact probability of
finding a valid signature with this method due to the com-
plexities in representing the parameters of a valid signature
mathematically, we hypothesized that the probability of finding
a valid signature was approximately 1 in 243.
We then used a modular multiplication algorithm for Graph-
ics Processing Units (“GPUs”) created by Kaiyong Zhao [7]
to write an implementation of this brute-force search method
that could find valid RSA signatures for each signature and
console type [8]. This implementation was then run using a
few desktop machines with high-end consumer GPUs and two
Amazon Web Services GPU compute (“p2.8xlarge”) instances.
By trying each valid signature as it was found, we de-
termined that the correct relative location of the calculated
hash for the Boot9 signature parser is immediately after the
signature on the stack.
XX XX XX XX XX XX XX XX XX XX XX XX XX XX XX XX
XX XX XX XX XX XX XX XX XX XX XX XX XX XX XX XX
00 02 B3 13 31 C7 10 41 23 33 A5 87 89 0F 9C F0
B6 A8 6E 71 C8 A7 8F 96 B7 60 82 90 3B 3E 54 EA
9A B9 35 97 8B BF 24 93 BB 82 9E 9A 5A 60 60 B0
C7 81 18 81 17 6B CF 9F E8 B1 C5 C5 E0 A9 53 27
DB 8B 52 EC 17 8A 88 4A D9 CF 28 DB 8B BF 29 22
C0 5F D0 34 AC 81 BD 23 1A EB 0C BE F6 F7 DE 6F
3A 30 81 2B 9F 9A 83 BF 33 25 18 91 BF A1 8F A3
8A 64 C6 FF 5F 77 DB E1 1C 37 80 C2 3E A9 F6 D0
0F 9C 01 D6 FC 8A 87 85 91 D3 6C 4F 64 AC A6 B8
D1 1B BE B2 14 76 10 3C 6E 86 FF 21 96 D4 65 BA
4D B7 8F 81 F1 D3 BC CA 18 6B DD D5 67 39 A1 2D
D3 61 22 F3 F5 B3 DD 51 8D DA C4 FA 29 39 5E A4
CD 9D FD 80 AF 8A 39 99 90 F4 FD D3 CD 6B 07 EC
21 22 43 7C CF C3 B6 2B 1D 14 93 A7 DB B4 42 00
30 62 30 1A C0 A5 D8 7E 1E 31 A4 02 0F 0B EA EC
26 99 4D 25 80 32 4E 60 C6 CE AB A6 53 9A C8 14
XX XX XX XX XX XX XX XX XX XX XX XX XX XX XX XX
XX XX XX XX XX XX XX XX XX XX XX XX XX XX XX XX
XX XX XX XX XX XX XX XX XX XX XX XX XX XX XX XX
XX XX XX XX XX XX XX XX XX XX XX XX XX XX XX XX
- Flag Byte
- Padding
- ASN.1 Type Field
- ASN.1 Length Field
- Added Length
- Calculated Hash
- Other Stack Data
Fig. 1. Structure of a plaintext exploit signature in memory
With our search method, we found 1 valid signature per ap-
proximately 8 trillion attempts, which was within 10% of our
4estimate (though we do acknowledge that our sample size was
small). At this rate, on this hardware, it took approximately 9
days to find valid signatures for all 6 signature variants.
With these signatures, we now have the capability to
fakesign custom firmware images and run our own code.
Additionally, because the Boot9 is burned into the ARM9
processor, this RSA signature parsing vulnerability cannot be
patched with an update to the system firmware.
V. EXFILTRATING SECRETS
A. Utilizing New Privileges
Unfortunately, because access to the protected boot ROMs
is disabled in the boot process just before Boot9 jumps to
the firmware entrypoint, merely having the ability to run
custom code from fakesigned firmware images is not enough
to gain access to the protected halves of Boot9 and Boot11.
Fortunately, this is not the only ability we have gained.
Recall that the various firmware header and firmware section
header parameters include, among other things, the boot prior-
ity, the ARM9 and ARM11 entrypoints, the physical addresses
to load firmware sections to, the size of firmware sections,
and the copy method used in loading the firmware section.
Of these, the most interesting is the location the physical
addresses firmware sections are loaded to.
B. Firmware Section Copying
In the previously mentioned “Nintendo Hacking 2016” talk,
we learned that Boot9 checks the location specified in the
firmware section header against a blacklist of memory regions,
but they are not very thorough. Specifically, only the Boot9
data regions are blacklisted. Fortunately, there are other data
regions which are just as dangerous.
Region Address Size Description
0 0x20000000 0x08000000 FCRAM
1 0x10000000 0x10000000 I/O Registers
2 0x08000000 0x00100000 ARM9 Memory
3 0x08000000 0x00000400 ARM9 Memory
4 0xFFF00000 0x00004000 DTCM
5 0x07FF8000 0x00008000 ITCM
6 0xFFFF0000 0x00010000 Boot9 Data
7 0x1FFFE000 0x00000800 AXI WRAM
Fig. 2. ARM9 memory layout [9]
The area of immediate interest is the I/O registers. Specif-
ically, the ‘New’ Direct Memory Access (“NDMA”) engine
is a memory-mapped I/O register. By constructing an NDMA
copy request as a firmware section and loading it to the NDMA
registers using the firmware section header, the NDMA engine
will perform a Direct Memory Access (“DMA”) to copy the
protected half of Boot9 to somewhere else in memory.
Because this NDMA copy is triggered by the loading of the
firmware section, it occurs before access to Boot9 is disabled.
We gave this copy request a firmware section header which
loaded it to the NDMA registers, then placed in a fakesigned
firmware image which would boot normally after performing
the request. We were then able to successfully retreive the
protected half of Boot9 from ARM9 memory after the boot
completed.
VI. CODE EXECUTION
A. Boot9 Code Execution
By using the NDMA engine in the way described, we can
now copy data from our firm sections to any location. Of
these locations, one of the most interesting is the exception
vectors. Because there are no restrictions on where we can
copy data, this allows for an attack in which we overwrite
the data-abort vector with our own handler before inducing a
data-abort by attempting to copy to NULL. This allows us to
redirect code flow to gain Boot9 code execution before access
to the protected half of Boot9 is disabled.
B. Boot11 Code Execution
Though we have managed to thoroughly break the security
of Boot9, this does not yet allow for access to the protected
half of Boot11. Fortunately, this task is made relatively easy by
the access we have gained up to this point. The ARM11 pro-
cessor operates in a 0x80000 byte region of ‘work’ SRAM
(“WRAM”) connected to the SoC by Advanced Extensible
Interface (“AXI”).
Because we already have reliable Boot9 code execution,
we have full access to the ARM11’s memory from Boot9.
This allows us to trivially overwrite a specific Boot11 function
pointer in AXI WRAM at the correct time, replacing it with
a pointer of our own. When this pointer is dereferenced by
Boot11, code flow will be redirected and we will gain Boot11
code execution before the protected half of Boot11 is disabled,
allowing us to gain access to the protected half of Boot11.
C. Implementation Details
It is important to note that access to the Fast Cycle
DRAM (“FCRAM”) is enabled for each processsor by the
same register which disables access to the protected half of
that processor’s boot ROM. Because access to FCRAM is
necessary for running the 3DS OS, it is not sufficient to
simply skip enabling these registers and leave the boot ROMs
unprotected. This means that the implementation of these code
execution vulnerabilities must take this into account.
For this implementation, we use a fakesigned custom
firmware image comprised of 4 firmware sections. Section 0
contains a Boot11 hook and an ARM11 ‘Stage 2’ payload,
which are copied to AXI WRAM. Section 1 contains a custom
data-abort handler, a custom data-abort vector, two Boot9
hooks, and an ARM9 ‘Stage 2’ payload, which are copied
to a safe area in ARM9 memory. Section 2 contains NDMA
copy reqests to copy the data from Section 1 to the correct
locations, which is copied to the NDMA registers. Section 3
contains invalid data, which is loaded to NULL to induce a
data-abort.
After all of these firmware sections are copied to the correct
locations, the attempt to copy the invalid data of Section 3
triggers a data-abort exception. When this happens, code flow
is redirected to our installed data-abort handler which installs
5both Boot9 hooks by overwriting specific Boot9 function
pointers. The data-abort handler then skips the copy instruction
which caused the data-abort before continuing the normal
ARM9 boot process.
When Boot9 dereferences the first overwritten function
pointer, the first Boot9 hook is called. This hook installs
the Boot11 hook by overwriting a specific Boot11 function
pointer, sets up the Memory Protection unit (“MPU”), and
sets a specific flag in memory to communicate with Boot11.
It then continues the normal ARM9 boot process.
When Boot9 dereferences the second overwritten function
pointer, the second Boot9 hook is called. This hook will wait
in a loop until it receives a signal from the Boot11 hook.
While this is happening, the Boot11 hook is called at some
point in the normal ARM11 boot process. This hook copies the
protected half of Boot11 to a specific location in AXI WRAM,
signals to the second Boot9 hook, then waits in a loop until
it receives a signal from the second Boot9 hook.
Once the second Boot9 hook receives the signal from the
Boot11 hook, it copies the protected half of Boot11 to a safe
location in ARM9 memory, signals to the Boot11 hook, then
copies the protected half of Boot9 to another safe location in
ARM9 memory. At this point, both protected boot ROM halves
have been copied to ARM9 memory and both processors are
synchronized.
Once the hooks are finished, both processors then jump
to the Stage 2 entrypoints. Stage 2 will check if a specific
key combination is being held down. If it is, it will copy the
protected halves of Boot9 and Boot11 to the device’s SD card
and shut down. Otherwise, it will attempt to load a second
custom firmware image from the SD card, activate access to
FCRAM by disabling access to the protected boot ROMs (if
requested to by the custom firmware image), then continue
the boot process. This second custom firmware image is user-
replacable and allows for adding in-memory patches to the
official device firmware on boot.
D. Boot Devices
Recall that Boot9 has three public key signature types: the
NCSD header signature, the NAND boot signature, and the
non-NAND boot signature. We have already explored how the
ability to create NAND boot signatures which appear valid
can be useful to an attacker who already has sufficient device
access to install a firmware image to NAND flash storage,
but it is difficult to reach that level of access because a chain
of exploits is needed (the firmware’s signature parser is not
flawed like Boot9’s). Fortunately, we have the ability to create
valid signatures for each of the other types too.
The NCSD header signature type is not particularly interest-
ing because it also requires access to NAND flash storage, but
the remaining non-NAND boot signature type sounds promis-
ing. In the previously mentioned “Nintendo Hacking 2016”
talk, the ability for Boot9 to load signed firmware images
from the Wi-Fi SPI flash storage was mentioned (presumably
for device repair purposes), but an examination of this storage
shows it to be unwritable without special hardware, and is thus
even less accessible than NAND flash storage for booting a
custom firmware image.
What was not mentioned, however, was the second alterna-
tive boot method we discovered upon examining the protected
half of Boot9. Before Boot9 attempts to load a firmware image
from NAND, it checks to see if the device’s shell is closed
and if a specific key combination (START + SELECT + X)
is being held. If both of these are done, Boot9 will check if
a standard DS cartridge (“NTR” cartridge) is inserted, then
attempt to load a signed firmware image from it.
By utilizing an exploit RSA signature for the non-NAND
boot signature type, it is possible to boot a custom firmware
image from one of the many commonly available rewritable
NTR cartridges (“flashcarts”). We can then use a similar
implementation as before, but this time have Stage 2 utilize its
ARM9 code execution to install our original custom firmware
image implementation to NAND flash storage.
This flashcart is then inserted into the device. Though it
should be impossible to press the required key combination
while the shell is closed due to the device’s design, a magnet
can be used to trick the shell sensor. We then just hold the
required key combination and power on the device, which
loads our custom firmware image and installs the previously
described exploit implementation to NAND flash storage.
VII. CONCLUSION
We have demonstrated attacks on the secure bootchain
of the Nintendo 3DS which defeat its primary protection
mechanisms. We used ‘blind exploitation’ techniques to forge
signatures and exfiltrate device secrets based on limited infor-
mation, then took advantage of weak internal security mech-
anisms to gain reliable early code execution and a method to
exploit devices which have not previously been compromised.
This weak internal security was best demonstrated by the
failure to properly validate the copy locations specified in
firmware section headers, showing an implicit trust placed in
the signature validation process. This use of signed malicious
firmware images shows the need for strong internal security
mechanisms to mitigate damage in the case of primary security
mechanisms being defeated.
REFERENCES
[1] Y. Lu. (2016, apr) The 3ds cryptosystem. [Online]. Available:
https://yifan.lu/2016/04/06/the-3ds-cryptosystem/
[2] 3dbrew Contributors. Bootloader. [Online]. Available:
https://www.3dbrew.org/wiki/Bootloader
[3] ——. Aes registers. [Online]. Available:
https://www.3dbrew.org/wiki/AES Registers
[4] ——. Rsa registers. [Online]. Available:
https://www.3dbrew.org/wiki/RSA Registers
[5] derrek, nedwill, and naehrwert. (2016, dec)
Nintendo hacking 2016. [Online]. Available:
https://media.ccc.de/v/33c3-8344-nintendo hacking 2016
[6] 3dbrew Contributors. Firm. [Online]. Available:
https://www.3dbrew.org/wiki/FIRM
[7] K. Zhao, “Implementation of multiple-precision modu-
lar multiplication on gpu,” 2009. [Online]. Available:
https://www.comp.hkbu.edu.hk/∼pgday/2009/10th papers/kzhao.pdf
[8] Myria. sighaxgpu. [Online]. Available:
https://github.com/Myriachan/sighax
[9] 3dbrew Contributors. Memory layout. [Online]. Available:
https://www.3dbrew.org/wiki/Memory layout
